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Preface 
Giving the future less weight than the present when making decisions is known as 
temporal or time discounting. The practice of discounting is perfectly sensible in 
private capital investment. However, for public investments, most notably those with 
long term consequences, many feel uneasy with what is known as social discounting. 
This publication has been written primarily for the New Zealand Ministry for the 
Environment. It follows another by the same author titled Future generations and 
the environment. That report was prepared to assist Ministry staff (and their public 
watchdogs) to interpret one of the five objectives in the New Zealand Environment 
Act 1986, that is, to: 
"Ensure that, in the management of natural and physical resources, 
full and balanced account is taken of ... the needs of future 
generations. " 
Future generations and the environment contains a chapter on time discounting. That 
was a useful beginning but it is not enough. 
Because the debate about discounting is very technical and difficult to follow, it is 
tempting to leave the problem to the experts to sort out. But the choice of discount 
rate used to evaluate public investments concerns us all. 
" ... the choice of the rate of discount ... is much nwre than a technical 
matter of interest only to economists and policy analysts. It 
embodies the values on which we make social choices that affect the 
state of our economy and our environment" (Lind, 1982, p.8). 
The aim of this publication is not to resolve somehow the issue of discounting 
environmental and natural resource costs and benefits. It is the more modest aim of 
opening up the debate to a wider audience. Because this publication is intended for 
a wider readership, some of the explanations may seem trivial or oversimplified to 
economists. But the intent is not to break new ground but rather to break down 
barriers between disciplines. 
During the late seventies and early eighties a very active debate on social discounting 
took place in New Zealand. An interesting account can be found in Forbes and 
Meister (1984). The setting of a 10% real discount rate for all government 
investment did not resolve the disagreement. 
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In 1986, one eminent New Zealand economist wrote somewhat sardonically: 
"... we face the daunting task of deciding on the actual rate of 
discount ... But in New Zealand this conundrum was solved long ago 
by divine edict: the discount rate for government evaluation shall be 
10% in real terms... While the rationale of the 10% has never been 
explained to me, the wags have it that it came in with the decimal 
system. .. II (Van Moeseke, 1986). 
In the last few years the ground of the discount rate debate has shifted. Government 
investment in natural resource development has been largely replaced by private or 
quasi-private (State Owned Enterprise - SOE) investment. Private companies can, 
of course, target their own rates of return and SOEs are not bound by the 10% rule. 
But the choice of discount rate by resource developers is still of interest to a public 
concerned with the depletion of natural resources. More generally, in "taking 
account of the needs of future generations" (Environment Act 1986), the public 
servants charged with this task should not allow such needs to be discounted away to 
nothing. 
The structure of this publication is as follows. Chapters 1 through 3 are primarily 
descriptive dealing with the use and context of discounting. In Chapter 4 the various 
rationales for discounting are discussed. Chapter 5 is about the dilemma economists 
face in choosing social discount rates. In Chapter 6 the "ecological" criticisms of 
discounting are discussed. In Chapter 7 some alternative approaches for guiding 
decisions with long term consequences are presented. Finally, in Chapter 8, I have 
tried to draw together some assertions about social discounting that should at least 
provide the basis for some debate. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 The controversy and the confusion 
When a cost is to be paid or a benefit is to be gained in the future rather than in the 
current year, it is reckoned to be of lower value. Thus, future values are discounted 
back to the present. The higher the discount rate, the lower future costs and benefits 
are valued compared with the present. 
Discounting is relevant to many aspects of environmental and natural resource 
policy. How should non-renewable resources be allocated over time? Is it 
justifiable to deplete renewable resources to extinction? What environmental 
burdens can we leave for our descendants to bear? Should we invest in research and 
development when payoffs are uncertain and distant? 
Discounting is not controversial when it clearly represents the opportunity cost of 
capital. Neither is individual "biological" discounting under question; we all give 
greater weight to interests closer to us whether in time or space.1 We discount all 
the time or how else would we restrain our obligations? Discounting should not be 
condemned as selfish; we do not consider parents selfish when they place much 
greater value on the welfare of their own children than on that of others. However, 
most of us do feel uncomfortable when the welfare of remote people - remote in 
time or space - is discounted away to zero. Thus, "social" discounting is another 
matter. 
Social discounting is both controversial and confusing. Social discount rates are 
bundles of different concepts and the ensuing confusion feeds the controversy. The 
controversy often falls along disciplinary lines, suggesting that dialogue may help 
resolve it. 
"The concept of 'discounting the future' is a point of fundamental 
contention between economists and moral philosophers. To 
economists, the concept is virtually axiomatic and thus beyond 
dispute. To many philosophers, the notion is, at best, arbitrary and 
unproved and at worst, absurd' (Partridge, 1981, p.8). 
"Ecologists", using the word in the increasingly cornmon broad sense to encompass 
scientists and others who see biophysical limits as important constraints on human 
behaviour, are another group who find the practice of discounting alien to their view 
rs;-;;w~ight, 1988, pp.50-S2 for a discussion ofhiological discounting. 
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of the world. In New Zealand, forestry scientists in particular have been vocal about 
the narrow forestry practice into which they are confined by a 10% discount rate.2 
Controversy occurs on a variety of levels. The debate is not just about the size of the 
discount rate. Further: 
"Fighting over the proper rate of discount, for example, leaves other 
more important questions unasked" (Goodin, 1982, p.53). 
What are these "more important" questions? In his paper, Goodin focuses on the 
first three below; the remainder occur throughout the literature in different guises. 
Why discount at all? 
Why discount all goods the same? 
Why discount all time periods the same? 
Can utility be discounted? 
Is there such an entity as a social discount rate? 
Is positive discounting unfair to future generations? 
Is the context of discounting - dynamic cost-benefit analysis - inadequate where 
there are long term consequences? 
Ideally, one could frame up a list of such questions and try to put the controversy to 
rest by answering them. But some issues are simply not resolvable. For instance, 
within the neoclassical economic framework there are two different optimal social 
discount rates. (See Chapter 5.) Moreover, the questions are not easily separated. 
The following statement illustrates the convoluted nature of the debate. 
"Just one of the problems in the natural resource sphere is that the 
discount rate is not independent of the state of the environment: high 
discount rates both contribute to resource degradation and are a 
symptom of it" (Pearce, 1987, p.263). 
2~7h~--~ff~~ts of discounting at a 10% real rate, as the N .Z. Forest service has practised, has had 
profound effects on forestry." Among other things, it has "virtually confmed production plantation 
forestry to radiata pine grown on short rotations" (Mead, 1986). "New Zealand Forestry" published an 
interesting exchange on the topic in 1986-87 (Fitzsimons, 1986; and Kerr, 1987). In reality, the New 
Zealand Forest Service used a 7% discount rate in their cost benefit analysis of all forest planting in 
1986 (Pers. comm., Owen Cox, Forest Research Institute, 1989). 
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1.2 What worries people about discounting? 
Many people feel uneasy when environmental goods and services are discounted in a 
cost-benefit framework. Conventional cost-benefit analysis (even with a low positive 
discount rate) seems to approve investment that will bring our generation some 
small net benefits but will inflict relatively large damage on future generations. Page 
makes this point with a "shock tactic", 
'~s you grow up, it is explained to you that the world is going to end 
very shortly because earlier generations wanted to live well ... You 
might well callout to the ghosts of the first generation, demanding by 
what right it made its decision. It would be hardly satisfying to hear 
the a~er, 'We took a vote of all those present and decided to follow 
our own time preferences'" (Page, 1977a, pp.169-170). 
Time discounting is, in the main, a technique of economics, but many economists are 
uncomfortable with it. Various pejorative terms like "immoral", "myopic", 
"impatient" and ''faulty telescopic facility" have been used (Olson and Bailey, 1981, 
p.l). Pigou was one of the early critics. 
" ... there is wide agreement that the State should protect the interests 
of the future in some degree against the effects of our irrational 
discounting ... " (Pigou, 1932, p.29). 
A later economist is far harsher. Writing on the generational time paths produced 
by economic models, Mishan says: 
"In effect, the models are 'cooked up' so as to give the imprimatur of 
science to what is, after all, no more than a popular ethical 
judgement" (Mishan, 1977, p.383). 
The unease with discounting would be simpler to come to grips with if it were merely 
a matter of the size of the social discount rate. The popular version of the debate 
has "developers" with little regard for the (distant) future lining up with a high social 
discount rate against "conservationists" who argue for a low discount rate. But low 
social discount rates are not synonymous with preservation of the environment. 
In the United States, environmentalists have favoured a high discount rate in the 
evaluation of regional water projects as a way of preserving natural areas. On the 
other hand, environmentalists have generally favoured a low discount rate in energy 
policy since high discount rates enhance the economic case for the rapid exploitation 
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of fossil fuel reserves (Lind, 1982, p.7). In New Zealand, similar inconsistencies 
have occurred. 
Because the economic viability of a project is sensitive to the discount rate, the 
discount rate often becomes a strategic number. Thus criticism of the discount rate 
can be used (by various players) as a strategy for gaining some (value-based) end. 
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Chapter 2 The context of discounting 
2.1 Dynamic cost-benefit analysis 
Much of the unease directed at discounting is, in fact, misdirected. Rather the target 
should be its context, dynamic cost-benefit analysis, or at a deeper level, the 
underlying ethic of preference utilitarianism. 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is a framework for comparing the pros and cons (in 
dollars) of a project. When costs are incurred and benefits gained at different times, 
a dynamic cost-benefit model is used. Discounting is a weighting mechanism that 
enables costs and benefits that occur at different times to be compared. 
When a firm considers putting money into a project, the future benefits (stream of 
profits) must be compared with the costs (both upfront and ongoing). The market 
or private discount rate used to do this is the interest rate. To a firm, earlier profits 
are more valuable than later profits since they can be loaned at interest. 
Individuals also employ discounting in every day decision making, although most of 
us less formally than a firm does in planning its cash flow. Shall I buy now or save 
and buy later? Consumer discount rates vary enormously. 
When the investment of public money is considered, another type of discount rate is 
sometimes used - the social or public service discount rate. (Whether these two are 
precisely the same for natural resource development agencies reformed into State 
Owned Enterprises is not clear.) 
There are arguments from both ends of the spectrum that social discounting is not 
valid; one end maintains that government should discount at the same rate as the 
private sector, the other that discounting is not an appropriate weighting mechanism 
for government to use. In the middle is the standard position that the social discount 
rate is lower than the market discount rate. 
There are two popular investment criteria in which the discount rate plays a critical 
role. The first involves bringing all costs and benefits back to the present, thus 
assessing the net present value (NPV). A positive NPV is a minimum indicator of 
"economic viability". The second criterion for acceptability is that the expected 
average rate of return (the internal rate of return, IRR) must be equal to the 
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discount rate. These criteria are not different versions of the same rule since they do 
not rank projects consistently.1 
2.2 What worries people about cost-benefit analysis? 
Some critics of cost-benefit analysis seem to believe that high positive discount rates 
are an integral part of CBA.2 This is not so and it is essential to distinguish 
problems with CBA from problems with discounting. 
What are the weaknesses of CBA? There are two common criticisms that are not 
the fault of CBA per se, but result from its misuse; these two are that CBA provides 
a too narrow basis for policy decisions and that there is potential for "rule by experts" 
(Pearce, 1983, p.2). 
There are two major problems with CBA itself. The first is the problem of 
valuation. For instance, in a CBA of a forestry investment, the future price of 
timber must be predicted. But there is a more intractable valuation problem, namely 
the attempt to place dollar values on goods and services that are not sold. In an 
environmental context: 
"The problem lies in the economic theory of value based upon the 
assumption that all assets are either reproducible or substitutable 
e.g., swimming pools for polluted beaches. Thus, at least in principle, 
permanent loss (non-reproducible) has zero value or has a value of 
infinity - permitting, perhaps, the surrogate value to be a function of 
the whim of the calculator!' (Friend, 1979, p.72). 
The necessity of expressing everything in dollars has been analogously (and 
colourfully) described as horse and rabbit stew. The rabbit is the small part that can 
satisfactorily be represented in dollars, whereas the flavour of the stew is dominated 
by the horse - the so-called intangibles (Norton, 1984, p.88). The horse is elusive. 
" ... we have to know the shadow price of environmental functions. 
And in most cases this cannot be found" (Hueting, 1987, p.65). 
r~'it-i~-;;~;:-widely (but not yet widely enough) realised that the present value criterion and the internal 
rate of return criterion lead to accepting and rejecting the same projects only if there are no budgetary 
limitations, if projects do not preclude one another, and if streams of net returns are first negative and 
then positive" (Stokey & Zeckhauser, 1978, p.167). 
2 See Pearce, 1985. 
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The second major criticism of CBA is that those who receive the benefits are not 
necessarily those who pay the costs; this is sometimes known as the "divergence of 
costs and benefits". Cost-benefit analysis is a relaxation of Pareto optimality3; it 
does not matter where the costs and benefits fall and so compensation need only 
remain potential and not become actual (Page, 1977a, p.145). 
" ... trade-offs are all too easy to make when the gain is ours and the 
cost is someone else's" (Pearce, 1977, p.360). 
Thus, many see maximising the present value of benefits minus costs (max. NPV) as 
intergenerationally unfair.4 
It is true that the use of the dollar as a numeraire causes great problems (and, like 
any numeraire, always will), and that CBA focuses on efficiency not equity. But what 
is CBA intended to achieve? No one methodology gives all the answers. 
" ... cost-benefit analysis is not a precise decision-making tool, but 
simply a means of summarizing information on some aspects of 
social welfare" (Kerr, 1987, p.9). 
Cost-benefit analysis works best on the margin, that is, when it is used to assess a 
project that is small relative to the economy. 
Both Kerr and Pearce express concern with the way in which "an outmoded 
conception of CBA" (Pearce, 1985, p.674) is set up as a straw man. In fact, "extended 
CBA tI (non-market valuation) is increasingly being used to make the case for the 
preservation of wilderness (Porter, 1982). Pearce makes the point that 
environmental destruction in practice often has nothing to do with CBA. 
" ... forest clearance in the Sahel or in Brazil, for example, has not 
been justified on CBA grounds but on grounds of macroeconomic 
objectives which reveal limited or non-existent understanding of the 
ecological requirements for survival" (Pearce, 1985, p.674). 
3-A-~-~~t~~~e is Pareto optimal when no one is made worse off; under the present value criterion some 
people (or generations) can be made worse off as long as benefits exceed costs overall. 
4 Page comments on the present value criterion: "To an assembly of representatives drawn from all 
generations, this criterion would not look much more attractive than the scheme of vesting total 
ownership and management of the oceans' fisheries to one country this year, to another the next year, to 
another the following year would look to an assembly of present-day countries" (Page, 1977a, p.200). 
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Chapter 3 The mechanism of discounting 
3.1 The mathematics 
How does a discount rate of, say, 10% decrease the value of future costs and benefits 
relative to the present? Understanding the basic mathematics of discounting is 
crucial since the strategic nature of the discount rate is an outcome of the arithmetic 
of discounting. 
Consider the most commonly used investment criterion, that of maximising net 
present value. 
Net value = benefits - costs 
In calculating net present value, benefits and costs must all be discounted back to the 
present. This is done using the following formula: 
BI-Cl Bn-Cn 
NPV = -------- + + ... + --------
(l+d) (1 +d)2 (1 +d)n 
Thus, if a project yields a net value 15 years from now of $1,000,000 and the real 
discount rate is 10%, then the net present value is: 
$1,000,000 
= $239,000 
(1 + 0.1)15 
There are two consequences of the mathematics of discounting that cause unease. 
The first is the sensitivity of economic viability to the size of the discount rate; the 
second is that over generational time, future costs and benefits virtually disappear. 
These two consequences are discussed in the next two sections. 
3.2 The sensitivity of net present value to the discount rate 
The result of calculations performed according to t.he formula above are extremely 
sensitive to the choice of the discount rate. 
Consider for example, a company planning to build a new power plant. Should they 
build a coal-burning plant or a hydroelectric plant? Most of the cost of the thermally 
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generated electricity is due to the cost of coal - a stream of costs that stretches into 
the future. On the other hand, most of the cost of hydroelectricity is due to plant 
construction and is therefore concentrated in the present. 
Suppose, for the sake of illustration, the coal plant would burn a million dollars 
worth of coal a year. The present cost of the coal burned in the twentieth year 
would be $149,000 at d = 10% but $554,000 at d = 3%. Thus a high discount rate 
favours the thermal plant because the fuel costs are heavily discounted. Conversely, 
a low discount rate favours construction of a hydroelectric plant. 
An interesting example of the sensitivity of economic viability to the choice of 
discount rate occurred in 1959 when a CBA was performed on the proposed 
Passamaquoddy tidal power project. This was advocated as a joint Canadian-USA 
venture. The Americans used a discount rate of 2.5% resulting in a positive present 
value but the Canadians used a discount rate of 4.125% resulting in a negative 
present value (Stokeyand Zeckhauser, 1978, pp.164-165). Presumably, the rational 
way out of the impasse - the Canadians subsidising the Americans - was not 
politically feasible. 
In New Zealand in the seventies the loss of "economic viability" due to an increase in 
discount rate was used to curb over-enthusiastic government investment in irrigation 
projects. The Treasury insisted on a 15% discount rate for one class of projects 
rather than the standard 10% as a discouragement tactic (Pers. comm., A. McArthur, 
Lincoln University, 1990). A more direct method of expressing doubt would be 
preferable. 
This sensitivity would not matter if discount rates could be determined objectively. 
But, historically, social discount rates have varied over a considerable range. 
3.3 The long term 
A second consequence of the mathematics of discounting is that, even at low social 
discount rates, the value placed on the welfare of future generations fades away to 
virtually nothing. 
"The economic theory of discounting is a completely rational theory. 
For slwrt periods of time it gives answers that seem intuitively right. 
For longer periods, we are not so sure" (Hardin, 1981, p.224). 
There are many dramatic examples in the literature to illustrate this effect. Pearce 
uses a hypothetical example involving the storage of radioactive waste (Pearce, 1983, 
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pp.52-53). Imagine that we know that a $10 billion accident will occur 500 years 
after we begin storing the waste. What is the present value of the cost of this 
accident using the relatively low discount rate of 5%? 
$10 billion 
= 25c! 
(1 + 0.05)500 
In general, people do not understand the power of compound interest (and, 
consequently, of discounting). This power may be better illustrated by discounting 
backwards in time. Manhattan Island was bought from its native American owners 
for 24 dollars. If we discount its present value at 6% back to the time of purchase, 
then 24 dollars was expensive! (Pers. comm., P. Van Moeseke, Massey University, 
1989). 
3.4 Some more definitions 
Some more definitions will be useful at this point. 
What is the difference between discount rates and interest rates? Arithmetically, the 
two are the same but they are used in different contexts. Interest rates are given to 
us; they are exogenous whereas discount rates are chosen1. (It is this element of 
choice and therefore, of values, that leads to such controversy over discounting.) 
Further, the discount rate is a more general term than the interest rate. We do not 
speak of "social interest rates". Interest is earned on commodities including dollars 
whereas discounting is applied beyond dollars to utilities (Page, 1977a, p.149). 
The difference between individual, market and social discount rates has already 
been discussed. There is one further important term. One reason why future values 
are discounted is inflation; we do not value $100 received next year as highly as $100 
now in our pockets because we do not expect it to buy as much. In social 
discounting, this effect is usually subtracted out. Thus, if inflation is expected to 
average 8% over the time period of concern, a nominal discount rate of 18% is 
equivalent to a real discount rate of 10%. Expression of an NPV in constant dollars 
implies the use of a real discount rate. 
Discount rates are generally positive. However, they may be zero or even negative 
as we shall see further on. 
rA-g~~d-~~lanation of the difference between interest rates and discount rates is given in Stokey & 
Zeckhauser, 1978, pp.161-162. 
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Chapter 4 Rationales for social discounting 
4.1 A mixture of rationales 
The fundamental question to ask about discounting is why do it at all. To 
philosophers discounting is a mechanism for constraining obligations, and to 
economists it is a mechanism for trading off the future against the present. 
But these general answers do not tell us how to discount; refining the rationale - the 
why of discounting - should tell us how to discount. And it is here that the 
controversy and the confusion discussed in the first chapter originate. Social 
discounting is based on a mix of (rarely stated) rationales. 
It may be thought that rationales are revealed by the choice of discount rate. But 
this does not necessarily follow. While a high discount rate is generally taken as 
indicating less regard for the future, it could also, for instance, reflect a great 
pessimism about the future of humankind. 
In this chapter I describe the various rationales that are given or assumed when the 
discounting mechanism is used. Various writers have discussed these rationales; the 
most complete attempts I have come across are those by the moral philosopher 
Derek Parfit (1983) and the public policy analyst Robert Goodin (1982). By 
focusing on the work of these two I do not wish to imply that economists are ignorant 
of their views. 
Parfit lists six separate rationales and Goodin, four, but they cover much the same 
ground. These rationales are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Rationales for social discounting after Parfit (1983) and Goodin (1982). 
Parfit 
Democracy 
Probability 
Opportunity costs 
Our successors will be better off 
Excessive sacrifice 
Special relations 
Goodin 
Uncertainty and risk 
Opportunity costs 
Diminishing marginal utility 
Pure time preference 
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Goodin's approach is much closer to the standard economic approach that forms the 
basis for the next chapter. Parfit goes somewhat deeper. He is not content to accept 
pure time preference as a rationale; he wants to know why people give preference to 
that which is closer in time. 
The following discussion of Parfit's arguments is similar to that in Wright (1988). I 
have decided to reproduce it here because the arguments may become clearer in a 
different context. 
4.2 Democracy 
This argument is that if the majority of people in a country believe there is no need 
to worry about the future, then neither should the government. Individuals generally 
discount the future heavily and therefore so should a democratically elected 
government. Public policy should reflect the psychological time preference of the 
electors. 
Parfit counters this by arguing that moral justification does not rest on majority 
beliefs. We do not approve Nazism because a majority of Germans supported it. 
4.3 Probability 
Uncertainty as a rationale for time discounting is presented at the beginning of 
utilitarian thought where Bentham gives it as one of two factors diminishing the 
value of a pleasure or a pain (Goodin, 1982, p.56). 
The argument goes that uncertainty correlates with remoteness - in time, and in 
space to a lesser degree. We are uncertain about what will be viewed as valuable in 
the future; we are uncertain about the results of our actions and policies; we are 
uncertain about the achievements of future technology. Therefore, when we look 
ahead to future costs and benefits, we scale down their size. 
But uncertainty does not always correlate with remoteness. 
and: 
" ... igrwrance does rwt proceed by fixed percentage increments each 
year" (Wenz, 1983, p.208). 
"When applied to the further future, many predictions are indeed 
more likely to be true" (Parfit, 1983, p.33). 
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4.4 Opportunity costs 
This is the "most orthodox justification" for discounting (Goodin, 1982, p.58). 
Benefits received earlier rather than later can be reinvested to yield more benefits. 
Thus, the argument is that the discount rate(s) used in the evaluation of public 
investments should be based on the rate of return that would be earned by 
alternative uses of the money. Under this reasoning, a zero discount rate is 
considered to favour the future over the present. 
A basic problem with opportunity cost discounting is that it fails to distinguish 
between investment and consumption. 
"It says that if you are thinking in terms of investments, you should 
demand the most advantageous rate of return, and you should 
discount less profitable investment opportunities in light of more 
rewarding ones. But there are some goods we want to consume rather 
than reinvest" (Goodin, 1982, pp.58-59). 
Freeman has argued that the opportunity cost concept of discounting can be used as 
a tool for intergenerational equity as well as intergenerational efficiency (Freeman, 
1977). Because "the exponential arithmetic of discounting works both ways", part of 
the benefit from a project can be invested to provide monetary compensation when 
it is needed.1 
There are a number of problems with this idea of an intergenerational compensation 
fund. There is no guarantee of compensation. . 
"The standard argument for discounting says that it is permissible to 
harm the future, as long as it might be possible to benefit the future 
on net balance by a compensating investment, whether or not the 
investment is taken" (Page, 1983, p.55, my emphasis). 
Further there is a presupposition that everything can be compensated for in money 
and another that "the interest rate i actually will prevail throughout the period", an 
unlikely possibility (Goodin, 1980). 
rs~pp~~-;-; project with a positive NPV is initiated that imposes harms on the future. Freeman argues 
that some of the benefit from the project can be invested in order to provide compensation for these 
future harms. There will be plenty of money for such compensation. Just as discounting rapidly 
erodes a large future value to a small present value, interest compounds a small investment now into a 
large future amount. For some discussion of Freeman's compensation principle, see Mishan, 1982, 
pp.290-291, and Pearce, 1983, pp.54-55. 
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4.5 Our successors will be better ofT 
If we believe that people in the future will be better off than we are now, we may 
decide to discount future benefits and costs. In economic language this is known as 
discounting for diminishing marginal utility. As more of a good is acquired the 
utility or benefit gained from each additional unit of that good falls. To not discount 
in an increasingly rich society is tantamount to the poor sacrificing for the rich. 
Economists would question the validity of this rationale for discounting. They would 
prefer to see decreasing or increasing marginal utility dealt with explicitly by 
adjusting the values of future benefits and costs before discounting. However, this 
expectation does feed into pure time preference. 
4.6 Excessive sacrifice 
Consider a situation in which the present generation may bear a cost that yields 
benefits to an infinite number of future generations. No matter how large the 
present cost, it will always be outweighed by the sum of future benefits no matter 
how small the benefit to each future generation. 
The corollary is that we must discount future benefits in order to avoid being obliged 
to make intolerable sacrifices for future people. 
Parfit argues that although "the argument from excessive sacrifice" may be a valid 
reason for discounting in some instances, it is irrational to use it as a general 
argument for social discounting. 
"Suppose that, at the same cost to ourselves now, we could prevent 
either a minor catastrophe in the nearer future or a major 
catastrophe in the further future. Since preventing the major 
catastrophe would involve no extra cost, the Argument from 
Excessive Sacrifice fails to apply. But if we take that argument to 
justify a discount rate, we can be led to conclude that the major 
catastrophe is less worth preventing" (Parfit, 1983, p.35). 
4.7 Special relations 
It is observed that humans feel the greatest obligations to those closest to them both 
in space and in time. People feel greater responsibility to their children than to 
other children or to their great grandchildren. Most of us recognise stronger 
obligations to those with whom we have a special relationship whether it be shared 
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blood, values, country, race, generation or whatever. Thus, we discount for "degrees 
of kinship" (Parfit, 1983, pp.35-36). 
This rationale is more commonly known as psychological discounting or biological 
discounting; economists tend to capture it within the expression "pure time 
preference". 
However, discounting for kinship is not always acceptable. Parfit uses the example 
of atmospheric nuclear tests. Governments who protect their own citizens at the 
expense of aliens are not generally considered to be acting morally (Parfit, 1983, 
p.36). 
Further, "degrees of kinship" do not decrease ac~ording to the mathematics of 
discounting. We feel obligations most strongly to the next generation, rather less to 
the next, and after that it tends to level out. Our feelings about the fifth generation 
from now are no different from those about the seventh generation from now. 
4.8 Is a social discount rate justified? 
Parfit's basic message is that why we discount will determine how we discount. He 
sees the mathematics of opportunity cost discounting as imposing an inappropriate 
form on other types of discounting. He is not saying that society should not discount 
but that there is no justification for a social discount rate, that is, for one formula 
and one value. 
"It may often be morally permissible to be less concerned about the 
more remote effects of our social policies. But this would never be 
because these effects are more remote. Rather it would be because 
they are less likely to occur, or will be effects on people who are 
better off than we are, or because it is cheaper now to ensure 
compensation - or it would be for one of the other reasons I have 
given. All these different reasons need to be judged separately, on 
their merits. To bundle them together in a social discount rate is to 
blind our moral sensibilities" (Parfit, 1983a, p.36). 
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Chapter 5 Choosing the "right" social discount rate 
5.1 The lack of consensus 
If the validity of social discounting (in the economic model) is accepted, at what rate 
should society discount? The failure of economists to agree on the procedure for 
choosing a social discount rate makes social discounting less than convincing to 
many. 
In 1966, Resources for the Future held a conference on the appropriate rate of 
discount for evaluating water projects. After considerable debate, the question was 
asked of each participant: "If you had to pick a single mmwer, what would be your 
personal estimate of the appropriate rate?" Answers varied from 2-4% to 20% 
(Lind, 1982, p.9). A second conference in 1977 came no closer to consensus on a 
single number. 
" ... at the time of this conference, the profession was no closer to 
agreement on the theory, on a procedure for computing the discount 
rate, or on a rate itself than it was in 1966. If anything, the work of 
the last decade showed that the issue is even more complex than we 
. had thought and that the range of disagreement, not to say confusion, 
is as great as before" (Lind, 1982, p.l0). 
In the last chapter we looked at the various rationales underlying social discounting. 
We saw that Parfit and Goodin were very suspicious of both the concept and the 
mathematics of social discounting. 
However, most economists do accept the concept of social discounting. They see 
two basic rationales behind social discounting - opportunity cost and time 
preference. Where a philosopher like Parfit is concerned to know why time 
preference exists and whether it is "moral", most economists are content to accept 
that it does exist.1 
Thus, the economists' problem is different. They look at two "valid" rationales for 
discounting and are faced with problems of choosing somehow between these two 
and of putting numbers on both. 
rI-;~~p;~t-economists would take issue with Parfit, and suggest that, at least some of the time, he is 
talKing about problems of valuing future benefits and costs, not about discounting per se. It seems to 
me that this is what Goodin is doing with his discussion of "nontradable goods" (Goodin, 1982, 
pp.60-65). 
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In the quest for a social discount rate, to some extent the question of risk and 
uncertainty can be put to one side and dealt with separately. This leaves two 
candidates - should the social discount rate be the social opportunity cost of capital 
(SOC) or the social rate of time preference (STPR)? 
5.2 Opportunity cost or time preference? 
The social opportunity cost of capital has several other names in the economic 
literature such as the marginal efficiency of capital, the marginal net product of 
capital, and the rate of return. 
If the social discount rate is taken to be purely the opportunity cost of capital, then 
there is no distinction to be made between private and public investments. Money 
for public investments is taken from the private sector via taxation and borrowing 
(Just et al., 1982, pp.304-305). Accordingly, any distinction between public and 
private investments will result in misallocation of resources between the two 
sectors.2 
However, most economists believe that the social discount rate should be less than 
the market interest rate. The two are only the same in an ideal market economy.3 
"The market rate of interest ... may not reflect the value of using 
resources in investment projects which exceed the life of the present 
generation or in investment projects related to goods for which 
perfect markets do not exist (for example, public goods)" (Just et at., 
1982, pp.299-300).4 
It is because of the existence of public goods (including the welfare of the unborn) 
that the social rate of time preference may be different from the opportunity cost of 
capital. People acting collectively may choose different options from the way they 
i-i~-p~~~ti~~ company tax gets in the way. Even if company tax were eliminated the problem would not 
be solved because private investments are more risky (Baumol, 1968, p.798). 
3 See also Sen, 1984, pp.174-177 and Mishan, 1982, pp.234-236. 
4 Even if one believes that public investments should be discounted at the market rate of interest, 
what market rate of interest is to be used? As consumers we receive one rate of interest for our savings 
and pay another for loans such as mortgages. Businesses pay other rates. This variety is due partly to 
differences in risk (Page, 1977a, p.149). There is another problem with interest rates. " ... it should be 
noted that interest rates are an important tool for macroeconomic policy; it seems unreasonable to have 
projects justified or not on the basis of the cyclical activity to which macroeconomic policy responds" 
(Just et aI., 1982, p.300). 
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behave as individuals in the marketplace.S If the STPR is not equal to SOC then it 
is not directly measurable; it is the outcome of a conscious value judgement. 
In what economists call a first-best world (one in which capital markets function 
perfectly), SOC does equal STPR. But we live in a second-best world. We are faced 
with two optimum social discount rates. SOC is optimal if one's focus is the efficient 
allocation of resources; STPR is optimal if the focus is consumer sovereignty 
(Pearce and Nash, 1981, p.164).6 
What is the second-best social discount rate? One way out is the use of "synthetic" 
discount rates - amalgams of SOC and STPR (Pearce & Nash, 1981, pp.159-163). 
In his exposition of the use of extended CBA in wilderness preservation, Porter 
summarises the economists' dilemma in hunting ''for a solution in the dark jungles of 
the second best" (Baumol, 1968, p.789). 
"Wilderness benefit-cost analysis cannot consider less than two 
interest rate concepts. One, the opportunity cost of capital (r), is 
eminently estimable, in principle and in fact. It is simply the 
(pre-tax) value of the productivity of the relevant marginal 
investments of the economy. The difficult estimate, in principle and 
in fact, is of the social rate of time preference (i). It must be used 
whenever society contemplates altering consumption, as opposed to 
investment, across time. But the greater ease of conceptualization and 
estimation of r, relative to i, has led some economists to recommend 
the rejection of i as a relevant ingredient in benefit-cost analysis" 
(Porter, 1982, p.71). 
5.3 A riskless social discount rate? 
In dealing with uncertainty in dynamic cost-benefit analysis, a "risk premium" is 
sometimes added to the discount rate. 
There are problems with this practice. For instance, uncertainty may not increase at, 
say, 2% per year and an inappropriate time path may be imposed on risk (Pearce, 
1983, p.89). 
3"Thl~i~-~~wn as the Sen-Marglin isolation paradox (Sen, 1984, pp.13S-146). 
6 An effect of corporatisation and the use of a "more market" approach is the substitution of SOC for 
STPR. 
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Further, a risk premium is added to an interest rate when a stream of uncertain 
benefits (the return on the investment) is expected. When a stream of uncertain 
costs is expected, for example, environmental damages, a risk premium should be 
subtracted from the interest rate (Haveman, 1977, pp.368-369, Pearce, 1983, p.89). 
This distinction is not well understood. 
It has been suggested that such a risk premium should be left out of social 
evaluations. Two reasons have been put forward for this - the-pooling argument and 
the Arrow-Lind theorem (Haveman, 1977, pp.369-370). The pooling argument is 
that the uncertainties attached to the investment of public funds are pooled and 
negate each other. The Arrow-Lind theorem states that even though individuals 
may be risk-averse, risk neutrality is the correct position for society. These two 
reasons for neglecting uncertainty only apply under certain conditions. Haveman 
concludes: 
"In the literature, then, the existence of social risk aversion is an 
unsettled matter ... In spite of the Arrow-Lind theorem, numerous 
economists consider that social risk aversion is relevant in evaluating 
uncertain activities" (Haveman, 1977, p.370). 
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Chapter 6 Ecological concerns 
6.1 Introduction 
Much of the criticism directed at cost-benefit analysis (and consequently at 
discounting) is "ecologically" based. Many scientists (and others) are dismayed at the 
notion of enormous future ecological damages being discounted to virtually nothing 
in present value terms. Some, conscious of biophysical constraints, find optimistic 
assumptions about substitution and technological potential worrying. That 
maximising the present value of a biological resource can prescribe its extinction 
discredits the approach for many. 
It is these concerns that the Ministry for the Environment should be bringing into 
the decision-making process. Who else will ensure that ''full account" is taken of such 
concerns in resource management? 
In this chapter these concerns are put into three groups. The first involves situations 
where a stream of costs, that is, environmental damage, stretches into the future. 
The second is concerned with physical differences between types of resources -
something that is unrecognised by standard economic theory. The third area of 
concern is with the role of technology. 
6.2 A legacy of environmental damage 
There are two aspects of future environmental costs that cause greatest concern -
cumulative effects and irreversibilities. 
Environmental damage is characterised by non-linearity, synergisms, thresholds, and 
so on. Thus, the cumulative ·nature of much environmental damage is critically 
important. The next increment of pollutant may tip the balance. 
Neoclassical economics is a discipline based on linearity, where wholes are sums of 
the parts.1 Cost-benefit analyses performed discretely - isolated from each other -
are unlikely to deal adequately with the non-linear cumulative nature of 
environmental damage. 
ri~-~~plifying here. For instance, the isolation paradox mentioned in 5.2, "the possibility of a social 
contract by which everyone will agree to do something he would not be ready to do individually" (Sen, 
1984, pp.145-146), fits into a systems view of the world rather than an atomistic view. 
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In a report on discussions in the United States in 1985, the European "ecological 
economist" Christian Leipert wrote about his concern that the focus of the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency is on CBA's of specific projects resulting in "a 
worm's eye view of the status quo". 
"The fact that this institution, with its elWrmous scientific arsenals, is 
concerned exclusively with projects at the micro-level reflects its 
integration into the dominant political process, which -i-slimited to 
political intervention for solving acute environmental problems. A 
macro-observation of the co-evolution of industry and the 
environment over the past fifteen to twenty years might produce 
insights into the crisis-producing and over the long term, untenable 
nature of prevailing trends in production and consumption" (Leipert, 
1987, pp.360-361). 
Linked to the problem of accumulation is that of irreversibility. To a physicist, 
everything is irreversible; whereas reversibility lies at the base of neoclassical 
economics. 
If our generation dams a river, then future people will have electricity and water for 
irrigation, but they will not have the option of not damming the river. They will be 
richer in monetary terms but poorer in wild rivers. Their marginal utility for 
undammed rivers is likely to be higher than ours. Thus, a CBA should show benefits 
from the wild river increasing over time - thus partly negating the discounting effect. 
Hence, irreversibility per se is not seen as a problem in CBA except where it is 
coupled with uncertainty. 
When we destroy an environmental good, we do not understand all the 
consequences. On the one hand, we may have destroyed an essential component in a 
food chain; on the other, technology may develop to make the irreversible, 
reversible. Economists have responded to the problem of irreversibility by 
developing the concept of "quasi-option value". Quasi-option value is defined as "the 
expected value of information gained from delaying an irreversible decision" (Kerr and 
Sharp, 1985, p.93). However: 
"While quasi-option value is definable, it is useless for decision 
making ..... " (Kerr and Sharp, 1985, p.95). 
On an ethical level, irreversibility is seen as a problem. Moral philosophers find the 
utilitarian perspective on the intergenerational problem to be inadequate. One 
economist, Amartya Sen sees a welfare approach to "calculated pollution" as 
inadequate, and draws a startling analogy with torture. 
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"The avoidance of oppression of the future generations has to be 
given a value of its own" (Sen, 1984, p.195). 
Various alternative moral theories for dealing with the future generations problem 
have been proposed; the one that seems to be gaining some degree of acceptance is 
Brian Barry's "justice as equal opportunity" (Barry, 1983). Under Barry's theory~ a 
legacy of irreversible environmental damage is seen as constraining the 
opportunities of future people and is, therefore, unjust. 
6.3 DifTerentresource classes 
The classification of natural resources into renewable and nonrenewable (and 
variants thereof) appears irrelevant to many economists. But there have been 
suggestions that physical characteristics of different resources should affect the 
discount rates used in their allocation. The case has been put in some instances for 
zero or negative discount rates. 
Consider biological resources like fish. Part of the reason for overexploitation is "the 
tragedy of the commons", but correction of this does not preclude extinction. What is 
overexploitation of the fisheries resource? To an economist it is overharvesting 
beyond the point of maximum present value. To an ecologist, it is harvesting beyond 
a sustainable level. Hence, from an ecological point of view, the discount rate 
should be linked to the biological productivity rate.2 
"The present value criterion may transform renewable resources into 
essentially nonrenewable resources, time-dated for exhaustion, as is 
true in some cases for timber" (Page, 1977a, p.167). 
When might the discount rate be zero or negative? The analogy is often used of 
shipwrecked sailors in a lifeboat with one source of food - a store of decomposing 
hardtack (ship-biscuit). It seems reasonable that the sailors will value a fraction of a 
piece of hardtack received tomorrow more highly than a whole piece today; in effect 
a negative discount rate is used (Stokey and Zeckhauser, 1978, p.175).3 
2ii~i~-gi~~ resources can survive even if the biological productivity is less than the discount rate 
because the costs of extraction may rise to eliminate the profit from extraction as the resource becomes 
more thinly dispersed (Page, 1977a, p.167). 
3 If the hardtack decomposes, the discount rate should be negative; if the hardtack does not deteriorate, 
then a zero discount rate is appropriate. Discounting at a negative discount rate is not unknown; people 
frequently save at an interest rate less than inflation, that is, at a real negative interest rate. For an 
argument that the discount rate most appropriately applied to energy may be zero or negative, see Hall 
et aI., 1979, p.502. 
22 
If however, the lifeboat washes up on an island and the sailors find they no longer 
live in a hardtack world but in one which can be made productive, a discount rate of 
zero would be unfair to the present. 
There is some disagreement about the validity of the hardtack example. Does the 
sailor who values a fraction of hardtack tomorrow more highly than a whole piece 
today have a negative discount rate or is the benefit to be derived from a gram of 
hardtack rising fast enough to more than counteract a positive discount rate? The 
distinction seems to be a matter of definition rather than substance. 
Thus the question of a "fair" discount rate depends critically on beliefs and 
assumptions about limits to productivity, substitutability and the potential of 
technology. 
"While many economists realize the inability of the present value 
criterion to resolve conflicts across generations, they may not 
recognize it as a serious failure. They tend to think that the world 
economy is not a hardtack one, but an investment one in which the 
future will be better off than the present ... Conservationists, on the 
other hand, tend to think that the world has certain hardtack 
tendencies and may, unless steps are taken, drift irrevocably into a 
hardtack economy" (Page, 1977a, p.170). 
6.4 Technology and substitutability 
Why is it acceptable for a biological resource such as a fish species to be made 
extinct by the application of the present value criterion? The response to this lies 
in the assumption that technology will continue to outpace depletion. The famous 
study by Barnett and Morse in 1963 showed that the prices of raw materials have 
fallen in real terms over the last century in the United States (with the exception of 
timber).4 However, extrapolation of this trend into the future is being increasingly 
criticised. For instance: 
"Of course the past century can hardly be taken as a guide to the next 
century. The enormous tracts of land that were opened up in the past 
century were quite literally a last frontier. Neither the path of 
technology nor the search for new resource bases, such as the sea, is 
bound by previous history" (Page, 1977a, p.176). 
7fThl;-~;q;;~ssion of the Barnett and Morse finding is rather simplistic. They compared market prices 
of raw materials not prices at the pithead. Falls in market price will be affected by efficiency gains at all 
levels. Depletion is but one factor. (Pers. comm., P. Van Moeseke, Massey University, 1989.) 
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Goodin expresses this problem in terms of "nontradable goods" - goods that cannot 
be bought and sold in the marketplace. The loss of nontradable goods "cannot be 
made good by gains (however large) in stocks of other goods" (Goodin, 1982, p.67).5 
Mistrust of technology is widespread; increasingly, it is recognised that technological 
advance creates problems as well as solves them. 
''Arguments to the effect that 'technology' will solve the resource 
problem are naive in that they fail to comprehend the fact that 
technological change is not itself costless" (Pearce, 1977, p.361). 
Many of these costs are environmental. Page draws attention to a "Gresham's law" of 
technology.6 
''A century ago air pollution was nwstly visible black soot, now it is 
much nwre complicated, with its pollutants nwre deadly and less 
visible... The natural selection of the market favours those 
technological improvements least likely to run into government 
prohibition; that is, ones whose effects are least visible and definite" 
(Page, 1977a, pp.177-178). 
Some interesting work has been done in New Zealand on incorporating 
technological change into the social discount rate (Van Moeseke, 1988). Paul Van 
Moeseke has proposed that the discount rate used in setting mineral depletion 
programmes equal "the long-run rate of technical progress plus the secular rate of 
appreciation". This, he contends, neutralises "inter generational bias". If the rate of 
technical progress is 1% and the real price rise (reflecting increasing scarcity) is 2%, 
then a 3% discount rate is "fair". 
)I-h~~~-di;cussed this in an earlier publication in terms of "unallowable harms" and "essential goods" 
(Wright, 1988, pp.65-70). 
6 Gresham's law, which originated in the sixteenth century, states that "bad money drives out good 
money", that is, coins with a high proportion of base metal would remain in circulation while coins 
containing valuable metal would be hoarded. The law is useful in understanding environmental 
problems. For instance, in the USA, a Gresham's law of pollution and labour has been observed where 
states with lax pollution and labour laws attract industry. 
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Chapter 7 Alternative intergenerational decision criteria 
7.1 Uncovering the ethic 
Cost-benefit analysis is, as Kerr reminds us, "00 nwre than a means of presenting 
information which relies on an underlying set of value judgements" (Kerr, 1987, p.9). 
However, in practice, the underlying value judgements are seldom mentioned and 
the criterion that net present value be positive is taken as an objective rule. 
The popular ethical judgement underlying cost-benefit analysis is the moral theory 
known as preference utiltarianism. It is not universally accepted as an adequate 
moral base for governing our behaviour toward our contemporaries, let alone as a 
grounding for our responsibilities towards people in the future.1 
Other criteria for making decisions with long term effects have been suggested; in 
each case there is an implicit moral theory. Consideration of these alternative 
criteria should focus on both the criterion and its underlying ethic. Three criteria 
and their associated ethics are discussed in this chapter. 
7.2 The sustainability criterion 
An emphasis on justice rather than utility that derives from the work of John Rawls 
lies at the base of the concept of sustainability. 
The concept of sustainability obviously strikes a chord in the environmentally 
concerned; a majority of submissions on the proposed resource management 
legislative reforms in New Zealand ''favoured sustainability being the keystone of the 
new laws" (Ministry for the Environment, 1988, p.15). 
A great deal of effort has gone into attempts to define sustainability.2 For the 
purpose here, a simple definition is adequate. 
"The basic requirement is sustainability, which we take to mean (i) 
conditions for the survival of mankind, and (ii) conditions for the 
tolerable survival of mankind" (Pearce, 1985, p.673).3 
rTh~~~-i;-~ growing literature of alternative moral theories on which we might base our obligations to 
future generations (Wright, 1988, pp.12-35). 
2 For one effort in this country, see Baines et aI., 1988. 
3 I am aware that some will object to the anthropocentric nature of this definition. 
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Page argues that we need two criteria (with different strengths and weaknesses) for 
governing resource use policy. The conservation (sustainability) criterion and the 
efficiency (present value) criterion "do not clash head-on" since one "looks to the long 
run, the other to the short run" (Page, 1977a, p.204). 
On the other hand, in a debate with Doeleman on the validity of cost-benefit 
analysis, Pearce claims that "modern" extended cost-benefit analysis can incorporate 
the requirement of sustainability using the new concepts of option value, existence 
value and bequest value. Doeleman's response is that, in practice, the political 
reality of CBA is one of high discount rates (Pearce, 1985, p.676). 
7.3 Almost-anywhere dominance and Pareto dominance 
In an attempt to show that discounting is only one way of going about 
intergenerational allocation, Talbot Page proposes two other candidate criteria -
almost-anywhere dominance and Pareto dominance. 
"The purpose of this article is, by way of a few simple illustrations, to 
place the discount rate mechanism in the more general context of 
intergenerational social choice. By doing so, it can be seen that 
discounting, as it is traditionally practised, is just one among many 
possible decision rules - and a narrow one at that" (Page, 1977b, 
p377). 
The almost-anywhere dominance criterion is simply that a majority of the 
generations affected by a project "vote" for it. Page describes it as an 
intergenerational version of majority voting in contrast to discounting which he sees 
as "the dictatorship of the present generation". 
The Pareto dominance criterion is that a project is only socially preferred if all 
affected generations vote for it; it is tantamount to intergenerational unanimity 
voting. It is not necessary that the benefits of the project exceed the costs to all 
generations as long as compensation is made. 
How might we guess how future generations will vote? Pearce and Nash propose 
the use of a "regret matrix" to make explicit the options and the costs of having 
generations disagree with each other on a particular programme (Pearce and Nash, 
1981, pp.209-211). 
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Page illustrates the three criteria - discounting, almost-anywhere dominance and 
Pareto dominance - by comparing a hypothetical solar energy programme with a 
hypothetical nuclear energy programme (Page, 1977b, pp.378-379). The solar 
programme is expensive initially and net annual benefits build up slowly. However, 
once established the net benefits remain virtually constant into the future. The 
nuclear programme is far more attractive for the first two generations, but due to 
waste disposal and risk costs is less attractive than solar thereafter. 
In Page's example, the discounting criterion favours the nuclear programme (unless 
d is lower than 1%). The almost-anywhere dominance criterion favours the solar 
programme and the Pareto dominance criterion favours neither. 
Page is not advocating either criterion as an alternative to discounting. His point is 
that other intergenerational social choice rules can be devised and that discounting 
focuses rather too much on efficiency at the expense of equity. He notes that equity 
has been incorporated into social choice within generations in a piecemeal rather 
than a consistent fashion and suggests that we bring equity into intergenerational 
social choice in the same way. 
Thus, rules of thumb such as "any programme which benefits only one generation and 
imrts all others is socially unacceptable" may be the best way of capturing our 
concerns for intergenerational equity. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions 
8.1 Some assertions about social discounting 
I have termed the following statements "assertions" because not everyone will agree 
with them. They do not comprise a systematic summary of the content of the 
publication but rather are intended to capture the main concepts. 
(a) Discounting at a positive rate is not necessarily unfair to the future. 
The fundamental concern about discounting the future is that it is unfair to 
people in the future; that maximising NPV is a path to efficiency and not to 
equity. 
Discounting future costs and benefits is not necessarily unfair to future people. 
In some situations, "developers" will want a high discount rate and 
"preservationistsll will want a low discount rate; in other situations, the opposite 
will occur. 
On the other hand, we have to keep in mind that we are maximising net present 
value. 
"The status quo situation is one of privilege for us, and no rights for 
the future" (Bromley, 1988, p.19). 
(b) The economic viability of a project measured in terms ofNPV may be extremely 
sensitive to the discount rate. 
Sensitivity to the discount rate grows as benefits and costs stretch further into 
the future. Thus, the choice of discount rate is strategic. At the very least 
projects should be tested for their sensitivity to changes in the discount rate (as 
well as to changes in benefits and costs). 
"In practice, a good deal of sterile argument may be avoided by first 
using a range of interest rates to assess project performance, 
discussion of the correct rate of interest only being required where 
different interest rates have a significant effect on the performance 
and choice of different projects" (Norton, 1984, p.87). 
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(c) The discount rate is often not the appropriate focus for environmental concern. 
"Indeed, trying to protect distant futures by dropping the discount rate 
may well be counterproductive, precisely because that inflates 
payoffs in the medium term (where the initial investments in 
large-scale, environmentally damaging projects are likely to be 
recouped) while still virtually ignoring really long-term costs" 
(Goodin, 1982, p.68). 
The appropriate focus may be the non-commensurability of market and 
non-market values or the underlying ethic of preference utilitarianism. 
If the result of a CBA is seen as unjust to people in the future, then it is 
preferable to raise the value of future costs and benefits rather than play around 
with the discount rate. Thus, the way to deal with long-lived environmental 
externalities is to value them properly before discounting. But: 
"... we have to know the shadow price of environmental functions. 
And in most cases this cannot be found ... In most cases the NPV 
formula is meaningless for environmental measures. Making use of 
it wrongly gives decisions the aureole of objectivity, whereas in fact 
completely subjective figures are entered whose correctness cannot be 
proved" (Hueting, 1987, p.65). 
(d) There are several different reasons why society might discount future effects 
and the reason for discounting should be reflected in the choice of size, sign and 
mathematical function. 
When social discounting is employed the rationale(s) should be explicitly stated. 
Discounting positively at a fixed percentage per year really only captures the 
opportunity cost rationale. 
Thus, the notion of one national social discount rate applied to everything does 
not have a sound basis. Further, those who advocate one public service discount 
rate do not agree on what it should be or how it should be derived. 
"There may ... be an argument for biasing resource allocation to the 
present, although whether that bias should be the same as that which 
results from the use of positive real discount rates (of about 10% in 
advanced economies) is very questionable" (Pearce, 1977, p.361). 
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(e) The long term is a major problem for eBA; the main areas of long term concern 
are long-lived environmental externalities. 
The discounting mechanism breaks down in the context of intergenerational 
social choice. Mishan shows that the economist's basic axiom of valuation based 
on individual preference is violated. 
" ... a rate of discount r could value a marginal $1000 of benefits to be 
enjoyed by some nth generation in the future, at, say, only 10 cents 
today. Members of this nth generation might well be indifferent as 
between $1000 enjoyed at, say, Y250 and $500 enjoyed at an earlier 
date, Y23(), at which two dates they are all alive. But in the nature of 
things, they cannot be assumed to be indifferent between an 
additional $1000 at Y250 and 10 cents at y 1, a time long before they 
are born" (Mishan, 1981, p.505). 
Discounting is a useful tool for allocating benefits and costs within one lifetime. 
Beyond one lifetime, the problem becomes one of distribution not allocation, 
justice not efficiency. 
(I) The political reality of eBA (and discounting) is often different from the 
extended "enlightened" eBA developed by pioneering theorists and 
practitioners. 
"Politicians also suffer from Pigovian myopia, i.e. they discount the 
future heavily and they are subject to political externalities" (Taylor, 
1987, p.ll). 
Cost-benefit analysis is very open to manipulation. When a positive NPV is 
perceived as a hurdle to be cleared then there is a temptation to massage input 
parameters. While politicians may discount the future heavily, others may be 
tempted to discount too lightly. 
(g) Some strong critics of discounting see it as still having a role in 
intergenerational social choice. 
For instance, Talbot Page proposes that opportunity cost discounting be used to 
define the intragenerationally efficient set of projects. Then concepts of 
intergenerational equity can be used to select the intergenerational social choice 
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(Page, 1977b, pp.380-381). Presumably, by efficiency Page means a positive 
NPV. 
In other words, identify the projects with positive NPVs, but do not necessarily 
select the project with the maximum NPV. 
(h) The discounting (and eBA) debate is not one of economists versus the rest. 
Statements such as: 
"Ec01wmists frequently find themselves reviled by environmentalists 
and others for supposedly applying a simplistic narrow, slwrt-sighted 
and materialistic calculus to public policy issues which leads them to 
slwrt-change future generations, the environment, mother nature and 
all her creatures" (Anon., 1982, p.l) 
are themselves simplistic. Most of the material used in the preparation of this 
publication has been written by economists. 
8.2 Some recommendations for social discounters 
Although the assertions in the section above contain implicit advice, it may be useful 
to distil from them some specific recommendations for practitioners of social 
discounting. 
* Be explicit about the moral stance and rationale underlying the particular 
discounting exercise. Then let this influence the choice of discount rate and 
mathematical function. 
* Be fully aware of the power of the mathematics of standard discounting. Test the 
robustness of the CBA result to variations in discount rate (and other input 
parameters ). 
* Use a pluralistic approach to decision making where non-market values dominate 
the CBA and cannot be adequately expressed in dollars. Use the CBA as a sieve 
to avoid economic disasters but recognise that it captures only one set of 
information. 
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